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COMMENTS 
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' DUTY TO WARN: 
TEN YEARS AFTER T ARASOFF 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A decade has passed since the landmark case of Tarasoff v. 
Regents of the University of California. l In Tarasoff, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruled that if psychotherapists determine 
or should have determined that their patient presents a serious 
danger of violence to another, they incur a duty to use reasona-
ble care to warn the intended victim of such danger.2 Reaction 
to the decision, especially by psychiatrists, was immediate and 
generally negative.3 Apparently in response to the magnitude 
and source of criticism, the supreme court granted a rehearing,· 
at which time it formulated the duty of therapists more 
1. 529 P.2d 553,118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). 
2. 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
3. For a discussion of the first Taraso/f opinion (including reaction to the decision), 
see, e.g., Note, Taraso/f v. Regents of the University of California: Psychotherapists, 
Policemen and the Duty to Warn-An Unreasonable Extension of the Common Law?, 6 
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 229 (1975-1976); Note, Duty Imposed on Psychotherapists to 
Exercise Reasonable Care to Warn Potential Victims of Foreseeable Imminent Dangers 
Posed by Mentally III Patients, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 536 (1975); Note, Taraso/f v. 
Regents of University of California: The Psychotherapists' Peril, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 155 
(1975-1976); Comment, Taraso/f v. Regents of University of California-Risk Allocation 
in Mental Health Care: Whether to Treat the Victim or His Patient, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 
553 (1975). 
4. See, e.g., Quinn, The Impact of Taraso/f on Clinical Practice, 2 BEH. SCIENCES 
AND THE LAW 319, 322 (1984). "Both the imposition of a mandated positive duty on clini-
cians and the specificity of that duty ... caused an uproar in the professional commu-
nity." Id. When the first Taraso/f decision was published, the Northern California Psy-
chiatric Society [hereinafter cited as the Society], headed a successful attempt to 
persuade the court to rehear its ruling. See Givelber, Bowers and Blitch, Taraso/f, Myth 
and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 449 
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Givelber]. The Society, the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, and state and local organizations of psychologists and social workers, joined to-
gether as amici curiae. Id. at 449. 
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broadly.& 
. The broader Tarasoff duty to protect third parties contin-
ues to generate concern among psychotherapists.6 Opponents ar-
gue that disclosure of patients' confidential communications to 
third parties may disrupt the therapist-patient relationship, 
thereby compromising effective treatment.7 Furthermore, psy-
chotherapists object to the imposition of liability premised upon 
the prediction of patient dangerousness.6 They contend that 
there is no consistent professional standard for predicting vio-
lence, and that such predictions are unreliable and inaccurate.9 
Additionally, psychotherapists are disturbed by recent cases that 
extend the duty to protect. lO 
In response to the courts' ongoing presumption that psycho-
therapists can accurately predict patient dangerousness, as well 
as the courts' recent expansion of the duty to protect,!l the Cali-
5. 17 Cal. 3d at 450, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33. For a comparison of both 
Tarasoff opinions, see Note, Untangling Tarasoff: Tarasoff u. Regents of the Uniuersity 
of California, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (1977-1978). 
6. See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
7. See Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Sueing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Soci-
ety, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976-1977); Special Project, Where the Public Peril Begins: A 
Suruey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 
(1978); see also Beigler, Tarasoff us. Confidentiality, 2 BEH. SCIENCES AND THE LAW 273 
(1984); Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protectiue Priuilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 289 (1977); Roth and Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality, and the Duty to 
Warn, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 508 (1977). But see Beck, When the Patient Threatens 
Violence: An Empirical Study of Clinical Practice After Tarasoff, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 189 (1982); Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 375 (1975). 
8. See Cocozza and Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Danger-
ousness: Clear and Conuincing Euidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1975-1976); see also 
Birns and Levien, Dangerousness: Legal Determinations and Clinical and Legal Consid-
erations in the Therapy of Violence-Prone Patients, 18 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY THERAPIES 
55 (1978); Schwartz, Some Problems in Predicting Dangerousness, 52 PSYCHIATRIC QUAR-
TERLY 84 (1980); Steadman, The Right Not to be a False Positiue: Problems in the Ap-
plication of the Dangerousness Standard, 52 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 84 (1980). For a 
review of research studying the prediction of patient dangerousness, see Wettstein, The 
Prediction of Violent Behauior and the Duty to Protect Third Parties, 2 BEH. SCIENCES 
AND THE LAW 291 (1984). 
9. See, e.g., Steadman, supra note 8. "Nowhere in the research literature is there 
any documentation that clinicians can predict dangerous behavior beyond the level of 
chance." Id. at 96. 
10. See Mills, The So-Called Duty to Warn: The Psychotherapeutic Duty to Pro-
tect Third Parties, 2 BEH. SCIENCES AND THE LAW 237, 239 (1984). For a discussion of the 
cases expanding the duty to protect, see infra notes 88-153 and accompanying text. 
1 L See infra note 158. 
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fornia legislature introduced Assembly Bill 2900.12 Governor 
Deukmejian vetoed A.B. 2900 two months after its approval by 
the legislature. IS 
This Comment discusses the Tarasoff decisions and subse-
quent cases defining the scope of the psychotherapists' duty to 
protect persons other than their patients. It examines the ra-
tionale behind A.B. 2900, and assesses the bill's effect upon the 
Tarasoff-related objections it addresses. In spite of the Gover-
nor's veto of A.B. 2900, there is a need for statutory guidelines 
to clearly and equitably define the scope of the psychotherapists' 
duty to protect. This Comment proposes a model statute that 
attempts to strike a favorable balance among the complex, over-
lapping interests of psychotherapists, patients, and the public. 
II. THE TARAS OFF DECISION AND ITS LEGACY 
In 1969, Prosenjit Poddar received outpatient psychother-
apy at Cowell Memorial Hospital at the University of California, 
Berkeley.I4 During therapy he confided to a psychologist his in-
tention to kill Tatiana Tarasoff, an unnamed but readily identi-
fiable young woman with whom he had become obsessed. It! Con-
cerned about his patient's behavior, the psychologist orally 
notified campus police that he would request Pod dar's commit-
ment for psychiatric evaluation. IS After the campus police took 
Poddar into custody and questioned him, they were satisfied he 
was rational and released him with a warning to stay away from 
Tatiana.I7 The psychiatrist in charge of the clinic then directed 
no further action be taken to detain Poddar, and ordered all 
documentation of the case destroyed. I8 Two months after confid-
12. A.B. 2900, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (1983-1984) (introduced Feb. 13, 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as A.B. 2900]. 
13. A.B. 2900 was vetoed by the Governor on Sept. 28, 1984. See memo from Gover-
nor Deukmejian (Sept. 28, 1984) (copy on file at Golden Gate University Law Review 
Office) [hereinafter cited as Governor's Memo]. 
14. 529 P.2d at 556, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 132. 
15. [d. Tatiana was spending the summer in South America at the time Poddar 
disclosed his intention to kill a young woman when she returned from Br82il. [d. 
16. [d. The psychologist also sent a letter to the Berkeley Police Chief which re-
quested the assistance of the police department in securing Poddar's confinement. [d. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
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ing in his psychologist, Poddar stabbed Tatiana to death.19 
The victim's parents sued the therapist and policemen in-
volved, alleging they had negligently failed to confine Poddar 
and to warn them of threats directed at their daughter.20 The 
superior court concluded that there was no cause of action be-
cause there was no psychotherapists' duty to warn or protect 
third parties.21 On appeal, the California Supreme Court re-
versed and held that a cause of action for negligent failure to 
warn could be stated against the therapists.22 According to the 
court, the special relationship between psychotherapist and pa-
tient could sustain a duty to warn an intended victim.23 The 
court ruled that the duty to warn was triggered once psychother-
apists determined or, pursuant to professional standards, should 
have determined that a patient presented a serious threat of 
danger.24 
On rehearing, the court refashioned its decision in several 
significant ways.211 First, the majority broadened the psychother-
apists' duty from the duty to warn to the duty to protect,26 hold-
ing that once psychotherapists determine, or should have deter-
mined, that a patient poses a serious threat of violence to others, 
they should exercise reasonable care to protect the threatened 
victim.27 Second, the court asserted that the manner in which 
19. [d. For a more detailed summary of the facts see Stone, supra note 7, at 358-61. 
The criminal case is reported in People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. 
Rptr. 910 (1974). 
20. 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
21. [d. The issue on appeal to the California Supreme Court was whether or not a 
duty existed. See Mills, supra note 10, at 240. 
22. 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137. 
23. [d. at 557-59, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133-35. The majority recognized that, as a gen-
eral rule, courts are reluctant to impose an affirmative duty, for the benefit of third per-
sons, in cases of nonfeasance as opposed to misfeasance. [d. at 557 & n.5, 118 Cal. Rptr. 
at 133 & n.5. However, the courts have recognized an exception to this common law rule 
if "the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct 
needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct." [d. 
at 557, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could assert a cause of action against the 
police defendants for failure to warn because the officers' conduct increased the risk of 
violence to Tatiana. 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137. 
24 . .529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131. 
25. See Stone, supra note 7, at 361; Mills, supra note 10, at 238. See also infra notes 
26-30 and accompanying text. 
26. 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. 
27. [d. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. Significantly, the court decided 
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the duty could be discharged would vary with the facts of each 
case.28 Warning the potential victim was again cited as an exam-
ple of exercising reasonable care.29 However, the court did not 
consider such a warning the only means by which psychothera-
pists could satisfy their legal obligation.30 The court left psycho-
therapists with only vague guidelines to look to in determining 
the nature of their duty toward third parties, and how they 
might fulfill that duty. 
In formulating its decision, the Tarasoff majority rejected 
the defendant therapists' contention that imposition of a duty to 
protect third parties was unworkable because therapists could 
not accurately predict patient dangerousness.31 The court ac-
knowledged that therapists encounter difficulties when attempt-
ing to forecast situations of violence, but asserted that therapists 
need not render a perfect performance.32 Finding psychiatry and 
psychology analagous to other fields of medicine, the majority 
asserted that therapists need only conform to accepted stan-
dards of their profession.33 
that the police did not have a legal duty toward Tatiana. Id. at 444, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 
Cal. Rptr. at 29. The court contended that a duty to warn the potential victim could not 
be imposed upon the police officers because the officers did not have a special relation-
ship to either Tatiana or Poddar. Id. 
28. Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. The Tarasoff court asserted 
that the matter "should not be governed by any hard and fast rule." Id. at 439 n.ll, 551 
P.2d at 345 n.ll, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.ll. "[TJhe adequacy of the therapist's conduct 
must be measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reason-
able care under the circumstances." Id. at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. 
29. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20. 
30. Id. The exercise of reasonable care included warning "others likely to apprise 
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reason-
ably necessary under the circumstances." Id. See also Givelber, supra note 4, at 450. 
31. 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25. Additionally, 
the majority rejected the defendant therapists' allegation that the giving of a warning 
constituted a breach of confidentiality, thereby adversely affecting the practice of psy-
chotherapy. Id. at 440-42, 551 P.2d at 346-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27. The court recog-
nized that free and open communication encouraged patients to express threats of vio-
lence to their therapists. However, the court further contended that psychotherapists 
should not be routinely encouraged to reveal confidential information; they should make 
disclosures to third parties only when necessary to avert danger to others. Id. at 441, 
P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The court concluded, "The protective privilege ends 
where the public peril begins." Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. 
32. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25. 
33. Id. The court acknowledged that professional opinion and judgment might differ 
regarding whether or not a patient presented a serious danger of violence. Id. As a result, 
the court asserted that therapists were free to exercise their own best judgment without 
incurring liability; a wrongful judgment was insufficient to established negligence. Id. 
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In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Mosk argued that a 
psychotherapist should not be held to a professional standard 
for predicting patient violence.34 Mosk contended that there was 
extensive literature "demonstrat[ing] that psychiatric predic-
tions of violence are inherently unreliable."3& He argued that a 
duty toward third parties should arise only if therapists do, in 
fact, predict violence, not if they should have predicted 
violence.38 
A. The Prediction of Dangerousness 
The ability of psychotherapists to determine which patients 
are seriously prone to violence is an ongoing controversy in the 
medical and legal communities.37 Extensive literature exists ex-
34. Id. at 451, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34. (Mosk J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
35. Id. In formulating his dissent, Mosk relied upon People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 
306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, reh'g denied, (1975). In Burnick, the court was 
called upon to determine the proper standard of proof in commitment proceedings of 
alleged mentally disordered sex offenders. Id. at 310, 335 P.2d at 354, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 
490. The court strongly argued that predictions of dangerous behavior were both inaccu-
rate and unreliable. Id. at 325-28 & nn.16-18, 335 P.2d at 365-66 & nn.16-18, 121 Cal. 
Rptr. at 501-02 & nn.16-18. The majority concluded that, in order for the court to com-
mit an allegedly dangerous sex offender, the plaintiff must prove the charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id. at 332, 335 P.2d at 369, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 505. 
36. 17 Cal. 3d at 452, 551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34. "The majority's expan-
sion of that rule will take us from the world of reality into the wonderland of clairvoy-
ance." Id. 
37. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court's 
imposition of a legal duty for psychotherapists to diagnose and predict patient danger-
ousness in order to protect third parties is just one of many contexts in the mental 
health and criminal justice systems in which questions regarding the prediction of dan-
gerousness arise. See Wettstein, supra note 8, at 292. The prediction of dangerousness 
"is currently used to assist in making a wide variety of legal decisions, from civil com-
mittment to the imposition of the death penalty." See J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PRE-
DICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 19 (1981). 
In Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 209 (1983), the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected challenges to state court impositions of the death penalty partly 
premised upon the prediction of future violent crimes. Id. at 3388. In Barefoot, the de-
fendant was convicted of the murder of a police officer in Texas. A separate sentencing 
hearing was held to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. Under 
Texas state law, one of the grounds for imposing the death penalty is "whether there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would consti-
tute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 
1981). Based upon the expert testimony of two psychiatrists for the prosecution, the jury 
found that the defendant should be sentenced to death. See Curran, Uncertainty in 
Prognosis of Violent Conduct: The Supreme Court Lays Down the Law, 310 NEW ENG. 
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amining the difficulties therapists encounter in making such pre-
dictions.38 Research in the early 1970's indicated that psycho-
therapists "were vastly overrated as predictors of violence. "39 
According to this "first generation"40 of research, the number of 
accurate predictions was unimpressive!1 A subsequent study in-
dicated that, with few exceptions, there was "no empirical evi-
dence" to support the position that psychiatrists had any special 
expertise in accurately determining dangerousness.42 
J. MED. 1651, 1651 (1984). 
The defendant alleged that the death penalty should be set aside because the U.S. 
Constitution barred the testimony of the psychiatrists at the punishment. hearing. 103 S. 
Ct. at 3395. The American Psychiatric Association (APA), in an amicU3 brief, alleged 
that the Supreme Court should bar from courtrooms, on Constitutional grounds, all tes-
timony by psychiatrists on the prediction of future violent conduct. See Curran, supra, 
at 1651. The APA relied upon numerous studies demonstrating that psychiatric evalua-
tion was unreliable in predicting dangerousness of convicted defendants. [d. 
The majority of the Supreme Court firmly dismissed the arguments of the APA and 
upheld imposition of the death penalty. 103 S. Ct. at 3396-99. The majority contended 
that the suggestion to reject all psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant's future 
dangerousness "[was) somewhat like asking us to disinvent the whee!." [d. at 3396. The 
majority observed that such a position was contrary to the Court's cases. [d. 
38. See supra note 8. Virtually all of those who have written about the prediction of 
dangerousness have held the terms violence and dangerousness synonymoU3. See J. 
MONAHAN, supra note 37, at 3. 
39. See J. Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second Genera-
tion of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (1984). 
40.Id. 
41. Id. "Even in the best of circumstances-with lengthy multidisciplinary evalua-
tions on patients who had already manifested their violent proclivities on several occa-
sions-psychiatrists and psychologists seemed to be wrong at least twice as often as they 
were right when they predicted violence." [d. 
42. See Cocozza and Steadman, supra note 8, at 1099. A summary of the methods 
and results of the Cocozza and Steadman study demonstrates the difficulties psychother-
apists encounter in predicting patient dangeroU3ness. The study resulted from a New 
York State statute which "mandated a determination of dangerousness for all indicted 
felony defendants found incompetent to stand trial." [d. at 1094. The courts based their 
determination of dangerousness upon psychiatric testimony. Id. Out of 257 indicted 
felons found incompetent to stand trial during the first year of the new statute, the 
courts agreed with the psychiatric testimony on 223 cases. [d. at 1095. It was the predic-
tion of dangerousness in these 223 cases that the authors evaluated. [d. 
The New York statute defined a dangerous person as "an incapacitated person who 
is so mentally ill or mentally defective that his presence in an institution operated by the 
department of mental hygiene is dangerous to the safety of other patients therein, the 
staff of the institution or the community." N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 730.10(2) (McKinney 
1971) (omitted in the 1974 statute). The authors found this statutory definition of dan-
gerousness vague. See Cocozza and Steadman, supra note 8, at 1095. Consequently they 
examined a wide range of variables which influenced psychiatric decisions. The authors 
studied psychiatric diagnosis, social and demographic variables, physical characteristics, 
and past contact with the criminal justice and mental health systems. [d. at 1095-96. The 
defendant's current alleged offense was the only factor which showed a significant associ-
ation with the psychiatric prediction of dangeroU3ness. Id. at 1096. The authors found 
7
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Based upon these early studies, the mental health and legal 
professions have concluded that psychotherapists cannot rely 
upon their predictions of dangerousness.4s However, recent "sec-
ond generation"4. literature indicates that the value of these 
early studies is limited if applied to situations such as Tarasoff 
in which mentally ill individuals receive outpatient psychother-
apy and continue to function in the community.·~ On the con-
trary, "first generation" research focused upon patients who 
were institutionalized after demonstrating their violent proclivi-
ties46; most of those studied had significant histories of mental 
illness and dangerous behavior.47 
Additionally, "second generation" literature suggests that 
predictive accuracy may be better than previously thought.48 
One recent study that "proposes to substitute data for rheto-
ric"49 contends that, contrary to claims made by Tarasoff oppo-
this association to be problematical. Id. Although the psychiatrists used the seriousness 
of the alleged offense as the principal factor in assessing dangerousness, they only men-
tioned it in approximately one third of the caSes. Id. Additionally, the authors contended 
that the use of this factor undermined the supposed expertise of psychiatrists; a lay per-
son, provided with only the alleged offense, could make similar predictions of dangerous-
ness.ld. 
The crucial question presented by the study was whether those defendants found to 
be dangerous proved to be more dangerous than those found to be nondangerous. Id. To 
determine the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of dangerousness, the researchers re-
lied on data from five sources: "(1) the maximum security hospitals to which both groups 
were initially sent; (2) civil hospitals to which some members of both groups were trans-
ferred immediately after the maximum security facilities; (3) hospital readmission 
records; (4) inpatient records of all subsequent hospitalization; and (5) subsequent arrest 
records." Id. at 1097. The results showed that the patients evaluated as dangerous by the 
psychiatrists were not more dangerous than those evaluated as nondangerous. Id. "There 
was no significant difference between the two groups on any of the measures of assaul-
tiveness examined." Id. at 1098. For a Table summarizing the results of the study, see id. 
43. See J. Monahan, supra note 39, at 10. 
44. See id. 
45. See Kroll and Mackenzie, When Psychiatrists are Liable: Risk Management 
and Violent Patients, 34 Hosp. AND COMM. PSYCHIATRY 29, 32; J. Monahan, supra note 
39, at 11; Wettstein, supra note 8, at 300. 
46. See J. Monahan, supra note 39, at 11; Wettstein, supra note 8, at 300-01. 
47. See Wettstein, supra note 8, at 301. For a further discussion of the limited rele-
vance of "first generation" studies in the duty to protect third parties context see id. at 
300-03. 
48. See J. Monahan, supra note 39, at 11. 
49. See Givelber, supra note 4, at 446. The Givelber study, in part, investigated 
Tarasoff's impact on psychotherapeutic practice. Id. at 461-90. One purpose of the study 
was "to determine the accuracy of criticisms that Tarasotrs ruling ... was unworkable 
because therapists lack agreed-upon criteria to assess dangerousness .... " Id. The au-
thors surveyed 2,875 psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers located in the eight 
8
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nents, therapists are rather confident in predicting future dan-
gerousness by outpatients.lio Furthermore, psychotherapists 
appear to believe that even if they cannot define dangerousness, 
they can employ objective professional standards for evaluating 
its potential likelihood. iiI 
Therapists' confidence may not, however, reflect their abili-
ties. Although recent literature suggests that the determination 
of patient dangerousness may not be as problematic as Tarasofl 
critics assert, optimism generated by current research is under-
standably guarded.1i2 Despite an increase in published research 
analyzing the prediction of violent behavior in different set-
tings,1i3 prediction in outpatient community settings has been 
largely unexplored. Ii. Furthermore, clinicians, when evaluating 
populations referred from the general community, erroneously 
predicted future violent behavior more frequently than they cor-
largest standard metropolitan statistical areas as of the 1970 census. Id. at 454. The sam-
ple was selected from the directories of the American Psychiatric Association, the Ameri-
can Psychological Association and the National Association of Social Workers; 59.5% of 
the sample responded. Id. at 455. The respondents were well distributed in terms of the 
sampling criteria-"profession, location, experience, and type of practice." Id. 
50. Id. at 463. "When asked to indicate the firmest prediction they would be willing 
to make about the possibility that an outpatient of theirs might physically harm another, 
only 5% of [the) respondents felt that there was 'no way to predict' such behavior, and 
over three-quarters felt that they could make a prediction ranging from 'probable' to 
'certain.' " [d. 
[d. 
[d. 
51. [d. at 464. 
[T)herapists appear to believe that there are objective profes-
sional standards for evaluating dangerousness or, at a mini-
mum, that dangerousness is a little like hard core obscenity in 
that they "know it when they see it," even if they can't define 
it. If therapists believe there are common professional stan-
dards or practices, it is difficult to fault a court for believing so 
also. 
52. See J. Monahan, supra note 39, at 11. 
No one thinks that the prediction of violence is on the verge of 
attaining a validity comparable to that of the prediction of the 
weather . . . . There may indeed be a ceiling on the level of 
accuracy that can ever be expected of the clinical prediction of 
violent behavior. That ceiling, however, may be closer to 50% 
than to 5% among some groups of clinical interest. 
53. See Wettstein, supra note 8, at 312. For a discussion of studies dealing with 
clinical assessment of dangerousness in other than inpatient institutional settings, see id. 
at 303-07. 
54. See J. Monahan, supra note 39, at 11. 
9
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rectly predicted it. 1I1I Additionally, the existence of discrepencies 
in the very definition of dangerousness complicates any attempt 
to make accurate determinations.1I6 
The absence of evidence indicating that patient dangerous-
ness can be validly predicted in institutional settings does not 
preclude the possibility of valid predictions in community set-
tings.1I7 However, the accuracy of predictions of dangerousness in 
Tarasoff outpatient situations remains uncertain until more 
comprehensive and definitive studies are published. 
B. Defining the Scope of the Psychotherapists' Duty Af-
ter Tarasoff 
Tarasoff established the duty of psychotherapists to protect 
third parties from dangerous patient conduct, but failed to out-
line criteria for defining the limits of that duty.1I8 Subsequent 
55. See Wettstein, supra note 8, at 308. One such study examined the relationship 
between the California Commitment Statute (the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act) classifi-
cation of "dangerousness to others" and the occurrence of acts that indicate dangerous-
ness to others. Yesavage, Werner, Becker and Mills, Short-Term Civil Commitment and 
the Violent Patient, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1145, 1146 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Yesavage). The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act provides that, after evaluations by a police 
officer or authorized medical professional, a mentally disordered person may be involun-
tarily committed for a 72 hour period of treatment and evaluation if there is probable 
cause that person "is a danger to others, or to himself, or gravely disabled." CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984). 
The authors studied prospectively, over a period of six months, 84 patients hospital-
ized at the Psychiatric Intensive Care Unit of the Veterans Administration Medical 
Center, Palo Alto, California. See Yesavage, supra, at 1146. Forty-six of the patients had 
been involuntarily admitted as dangerous to others, and 38 had been admitted for other 
reasons. [d. The nursing staff was required to chart all instances of assault-related be-
havior on the ward. [d. The results indicated that 65% of the group considered danger-
ous to others had at least one assault-related event during the week following admission, 
and 47% of the group not considered dangerous to others had one such event. [d. The 
authors concluded that patients labeled dangerous for purposes of involuntary commit-
ment "were no different in the extent of their dangerous behavior on the ward than were 
patients labeled nondangerous." [d. at 1147. 
56. See Cocozza and Steadman, supra note 8, at 1085-87; see also Wettstein, supra 
note 8, at 293. "Many have decried the inconsistency, overinclusiveness, and vagueness 
with which the law has defined dangerousness and have admonished the courts and legis-
latures to more precisely delineate the nature, severity, frequency, and imminence of the 
conduct under question." [d. See also Birns and Levien, Dangerousness: Legal Determi-
nations and Clinical Speculations, 52 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 108 (1980). 
57. See J. Monahan, supra note 39, at 11. 
58. See Cooper, Duty to Warn Third Parties, 248 J. A.M.A. 431, 431 (July 23/30 
10
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California cases have addressed emerging problems, and have at-
tempted to establish guidelines defining the nature of the duty 
psychotherapists owe potential victims.1I9 
In Thompson v. County of Alameda,60 the California Su-
preme Court refused to extend the psychotherapists' duty to 
protect to include probation officers.6! The parents of a young 
child sued the county for the wrongful death of their son.62 The 
child was killed within twenty-four hours after a juvenile of-
fender, James F., was released from confinement into the tempo-
rary custody of his mother.63 The county knew James had stated 
he would kill at random, a child in the community; but nonethe-
less, county officials released him without warning local police, 
parents, or James' mother.64 
Distinguishing Thompson from precedent that imposed a 
duty toward third parties,611 the Thompson majority refused to 
1982); Mills, supra note 10, at 238. 
59. See infra notes 60-153 and accompanying text. Although the Tarasoff decisions 
have caused great concern, "it is those cases that have arisen subsequent to Tarasoff, 
though grounded in its reasoning, that have caused the greatest concern." See Mills, 
supra note 10, at 238. 
60. 152 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1979), vacated, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 
70 (1980). 
61. See Note, At/irmative Duty After Tarasoff, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1013 (1982-
1983); Note, Thompson u. County of Alameda: Tort Plaintiffs' Paradise Lost?, 76 Nw. 
V.L. REV. 331 (1981-1982). 
62. 27 Cal. 3d at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The plaintiffs' complaint 
alleged that the minor child's death was caused by the county's "reckless, wanton and 
grossly negligent" actions in releasing James, failing to advise and/or warn James' 
mother, the local police, or "parents of young children within the immediate vicinity" of 
James' mother's residence, failing to exercise due care in maintaining custody and con-
trol over James through his mother, and failing to exercise reasonable care in selecting 
James' mother as his custodian. Id. 
63. Id. Prior to killing the plaintiffs' son, James had been confined, pursuant to a 
court order, in a county institution. Id. The reason for James' custody was, for some 
reason, not apparent. 152 Cal. Rptr. at 228. 
64. 27 Cal. 3d at 746, 614 P.2d at 730, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The county also knew 
that James had" 'latent, extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young 
children and that sexual assaults upon young children and violence connected therewith 
were a likely result of releasing [him) into the community.' " Id. 
65. Id. at 750-58, 614 P.2d at 733-38, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75-80. In concluding that the 
county owed no duty to warn the plaintiffs of James' release, the court distinguished 
Thompson from Tarasoff and Johnson v. State of California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 
352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, reh'g denied, (1968). In Johnson, the state released a minor pa-
rolee with homicidal tendencies and a background of violence and cruelty into the John-
sons' home without giving warnings of the parolee's latent, dangerous qualities. The 
youth assaulted Mrs. Johnson, whereupon she brought a suit against the state for her 
11
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impose "blanket liability."66 The court argued that liability may 
be imposed only "[i]n those instances in which the released of-
fender posed a predictable threat of harm to a named or readily 
identifiable victim .... "67 On the contrary, James had made a 
"generalized threat to a segment of the population."6s Further-
more, the court asserted that a special relationship did not exist 
between the county and either the plaintiffs or their deceased 
son.6S Relying on Tarasoff, the court found such a relationship 
essential to sustain an affirmative duty to protect third parties.70 
Justice Tobriner, who wrote for the majority in Taras off, 
dissented in Thompson.71 Tobriner contended that the majority 
misread controlling precedent.72 According to Tobriner, the 
court failed to recognize that the county stood in a special rela-
tionship to James because he was in their custody.7s This rela-
injuries. Id. at 784-85, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242. The court sustained the 
plaintiffs' cause of action and claimed that the state owed her a duty of care. Id. at 786, 
447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243. The Johnson court contended that "the state's 
relationship to plaintiff was such that its duty extended to warning of latent, dangerous 
qualities suggested by the parolee's history or character." Id. at 785, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 
Cal. Rptr. at 243. Furthermore, the court asserted that a duty would be imposed upon 
those who created a "foreseeable peril." Id. at 786, 447 P.2d at 355, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 243. 
66. 27 Cal. 3d at 753, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76. Prior to examining the 
plaintiffs' contention that the county was liable for its failure to warn persons of James' 
release, the court found that the county's decision to release James, its selection of his 
custodian, and its supervision of her activities were statutorily immunized from liability. 
Id. at 747-49, 614 P.2d at 730-32, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 72-74. Nevertheless, the court in-
quired whether, in spite of this immunity, the county had a duty to warn for the protec-
tion of the plaintiffs. Id. at 749, 614 P.2d at 732, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 74. 
67. Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
68. Id. at 750, 614 P.2d at 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The court argued that warnings 
to a broad segment of the population would be ineffective and difficult to issue. Id. at 
755, 614 P.2d at 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 78. See also Le Blang, The Duty to Warn Third 
Parties Threatened by a Patient, 10 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRACTICE 1, 2-3 (Aug. 
1982). 
69. 27 Cal. 3d at 753, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76. "Unlike Johnson and 
Tarasoff, plaintiffs here have alleged neither that a direct or continuing relationship be-
tween them and [c]ounty existed ... nor that their decedent was a foreseeable or read-
ily identifiable target of the juvenile offender's threats." Id. 
Additionally, the court based its decision upon public policy considerations. Id. The 
court noted there is an ever present danger of parole violations. Id. at 754, 614 P.2d at 
735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77. However, probation programs are such an integral part of the 
correctional system that the general public must bear the risks created by rehabilitative 
efforts. Id. at 753, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77. 
70. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
71. 27 Cal. 3d at 759, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 759-60, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
73. Id. at 759, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
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tionship imposed a duty on the county to warn third parties of 
potential danger caused by the juvenile offender's release.74 Also, 
Tobriner argued, Tarasoff did not hold that the duty to protect 
runs only to identifiable victims; the duty extends to foreseeable 
victims.7& 
In Bellah v. Greenson,76 a California appellate court again 
declined to extend the holding of Tarasoff. 77 The parents of a 
young woman who committed suicide brought suit against her 
psychiatrist for failure to warn them of their daughter's suicidal 
tendencies.78 Although the victim's psychiatrist was aware of 
and documented his patient's suicidal threats,79 the court re-
fused to find a duty on the part of the psychiatrist.80 
Relying primarily upon Tarasoff,81 the Bellah court decided 
not to impose liability where the danger presented was that of 
self-inflicted harm or property damage.82 According to Bellah, 
Tarasoff did not require therapists to warn others of the likeli-
hood of any and all harm.83 Rather, the court noted, Tarasoff 
required a therapist to disclose confidential information if "the 
strong interest in confidentiality [was] counterbalanced by an 
even stronger public interest ... [in] safety from violent as-
sault."84 The court recognized that the therapeutic relationship 
could be compromised if therapists revealed that their patients 
manifested suicidal tendencies.81i Furthermore, the need for con-
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 81. "The principles underlying the 
Tarasoff decision indicate that. . . the existence of an identifiable victim is not essential 
to the cause of action. [The] decision rested upon the basic tenet of tort law that a 
'defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his 
conduct ... .''' [d. 
76. 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977), aff'd, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, reh'g 
denied, (1978). 
77. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 540. 
78. [d. at 618, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 537. The decedent had been under the care of the 
defendant psychiatrist for an unspecified period of time. [d. At the time of the dece-
dent's death, her parents were living in another state, and were unaware that their 
daughter was contemplating suicide. [d. 
'79. [d. 
80. See infra notes 81-86. 
81. 81 Cal. App. 3d at 620-23, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 538-40. 
82. [d. at 621-22, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 538-40. 
83. [d. at 621, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539. 
84. [d. 
85. [d. 
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fidentiality would not be outweighed by the risk of suicide or 
property damage.88 
The Bellah opinion was not surprising considering the bal-
ancing of interests executed by the Tarasoff court. The Tarasoff 
decision was premised upon the majority's desire to discourage 
threatened violent attacks upon unsuspecting individuals." This 
objective would not be served if the threat were of self-inflicted 
harm or property damage. 
Two recent California cases may signal a trend to extend 
the psychotherapists' duty to protect third parties.88 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying California tort 
law, broadened this duty in Jablonski by Pahls v. United 
States.89 Jablonski threatened to rape Pahls, the mother of his 
girlfriend.90 Pahls notified the police with whom she discussed 
possible psychiatric treatment for Jablonski.91 Subsequently, 
Jablonski consented to outpatient evaluation at the Veterans 
Administration Hospital (the hospital).911 The police spoke to the 
Chief of Psychiatry at the hospital, and told him of Jablonski's 
recent threats of violence.9s The Chief of Psychiatry failed to re-
lay the information to the psychiatrist who ultimately evaluated 
Jablonski,94 
During a preliminary session at the hospital, Jablonski's 
doctor diagnosed him as having an "antisocial personality" and 
being "potentially dangerous."9& Jablonski refused recommenda-
tions for voluntary commitment, and after his psychiatrist deter-
86. [d. at 622, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 540. 
87. 17 Cal. 3d at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. "Our current crowded 
and computerized society compels the interdependence of its members. In this risk-in-
fested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result 
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal." [d. 
88. Jablonski by Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983); Hedlund v. 
Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805, reh'g denied, (1983). 
89. 712 F.2d 391. 
90. [d. at 393. Jablonski's girlfriend was actually his common-law spouse. See Mills, 
supra note 10, at 249. 
91. 712 F.2d at 393. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. In addition to the attempted rape, Jablonski threatened his girlfriend's 
mother with a sharp object and made obscene telephone calls to her. [d. 
94. [d. Jablonski's psychiatrist testified that had he received the details of his pa-
tient's history, he would have sought his involuntary hospitalization. [d. 
95. [d. 
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mined no emergency existed, he directed Jablonski to return in 
two weeks.B6 The psychiatrist made no attempt to obtain his pa-
tient's prior medical records which documented that Jablonski 
had a "homicidal ideation towards his wife," and that "future 
violent behavior was a distinct probability."B7 
Following the preliminary session, Jablonski's girlfriend told 
his psychiatrist that she was concerned about Jablonski's un-
usual behavior.B8 The psychiatrist suggested that she leave 
Jablonski, at least during the evaluation period, but she told 
him she loved Jablonski.BB Subsequently, Jablonski's girlfriend's 
mother complained to Jablonski's psychiatrist that his patient 
be seen before the next scheduled visit. loO Jablonski's psychia-
trist agreed to see him four days later.10l Meanwhile, Jablonski's 
girlfriend moved out of the apartment that she had shared with 
Jablonski, but continued to see him intermittently.l02 
On his second visit, Jablonski met with his psychiatrist and 
his psychiatrist's supervisor. The supervisor believed Jablonski 
was an " 'antisocial personality with explosive features,' ... was 
dangerous and [constituted] an 'emergency.' "103 The psychia-
trists again found no basis for involuntary commitment, and 
they advised Jablonski to continue outpatient evaluation.l04 Two 
days later Jablonski attacked and murdered his girlfriend. 1011 
96. [d. 
97. [d. Prior medical records revealed that Jablonski had received extensive care at 
an Army hospital in EI Paso. The final diagnosis at the time concluded, in part, that 
Jablonski had a "schizophrenic reaction; undifferentiated type; chronic, moderate; mani-
fested by homicidal behavior toward his wife." [d. at 393-94. Dr. Thompson, an expert 
witness for the decedent's daughter, testified that, according to professional standards in 
the community, Jablonski was potentially very dangerous, and that prior medical records 
should have been obtained. [d. at 393. 
98. [d. 
99. [d. The psychiatrist gave Jablonski's girlfriend no further warnings because he 
believed she would be non-compliant because of her emotional attachment to Jablonski. 
[d. 
100. [d. at 394. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. Jablonski remained vague about his prior psychiatric treatment and again 
refused a request for his voluntary admission as an inpatient. His psychiatrists scheduled 
more tests and prescribed Valium. [d. 
105. [d. 
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The victim's minor daughter brought suit for the wrongful 
death of her mother. lo6 She alleged that the Veterans Adminis-
tration psychiatrists were negligent in treating Jablonski and 
proximately caused her mother's death. lo7 The district court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and held that the psychiatrists 
negligently failed to obtain Jablonski's prior records, failed to 
record warnings by the police concerning their patient, and 
failed to warn the victim.lo6 
On appeal, the hospital contended that it had no duty to 
warn the victim because Jablonski made no specific threats 
against her.loe The court reasoned that the Jablonski case "falls 
somewhere between the extremes of Tarasoff and Thompson v. 
Alameda," but closer to Tarasoff. 110 Unlike Poddar in Tarasoff, 
who made specific threats directed at a specific victim, Jablonski 
did not threaten any particular person.lll However, the Jablon-
ski court asserted that Jablonski had a markedly violent history 
toward his wife which meant his girlfriend was" 'targeted' " to a 
greater extent than the children in Thompson. 112 Furthermore, 
the court concluded that the logistical difficulties of warning an 
intended victim which existed in the Thompson case, were ab-
sent in Jablonski. u3 
The Jablonski decision is significant because the court im-
posed liability, for failure to protect a potential victim, even 
though a mentally ill patient made no actual threats against a 
particular individual. The court reviewed Jablonski's conduct in 
therapy and his past medical record and concluded that his doc-
tors should have determined that he was dangerous. Signifi-
cantly' the court relied upon the district court judge's finding 
that the psychiatrists negligently failed to obtain Jablonski's 
prior medical record. m The court agreed that the medical rec-
106. [d. at 392. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. at 397. According to the Court of Appeals, anyone of the findings, if not 
clearly erroneous, would support a judgment for the plaintiff. [d. 
109. [d. at 398. 
110. [d. 
111. [d. 
112. [d. 
113. [d. The Jablonski court argued that warning Jablonski's girlfriend "would have 
posed no difficulty for the doctors, especially since she twice expressed her fear of 
Jablonski directly to them." [d. 
114. [d. 
16
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ord provided necessary information for determining that Jablon-
ski's girlfriend was a foreseeable victim, and therefore, the fail-
ure to obtain the record was integral to the conclusion that the 
psychiatrists breached their duty to protect third parties.l15 
Also significant was the court's willingness to impose liabil-
ity even though the victim had received warnings from a variety 
of sources.1l6 As noted previously, Tarasoff established that a di-
rect warning to the victim could discharge the psychotherapists' 
duty to protect. ll7 However, the Jablonski court established that 
a warning, per se, might not discharge this duty. On the con-
trary, if a warning were "unspecific and inadequate under the 
circumstances," the psychotherapist could still be liable. lIS 
The second case expanding the psychotherapists' duty to 
protect is Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County.lI9 In 
Hedlund, the California Supreme Court ruled that "a young 
child injured during a violent assault on his mother may state a 
cause of action under Tarasoff . ... "120 In 1977, La Nita Wilson 
and Stephen Wilson (no relation) received therapy from the two 
defendant psychologists. 121 In the course of treatment, Stephen 
told the psychologists of his intent to commit serious bodily in-
jury upon La Nita.122 The defendants did not communicate 
these threats to the intended victim. us Subsequently, Stephen 
shot La Nita, who sustained severe internal and lower extremity 
injuries.124 Just prior to the blast, La Nita threw herself on top 
of her two year old son, Darryl, seated next to her in a car, to 
115. [d. at 399. 
116. [d. at 398. For a complete list of those who provided warnings, see Kamenar, 
Psychiatrists' Duty to Warn of a Dangerous Patient: A Survey of the Law, 2 BEH. SCI-
ENCES AND THE LAW 259, 268. 
117. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
118. 712 F.2d at 398. The court's decision to impose liability upon the VA psychia-
trists might have been influenced by the fact that the government was a defendant. Such 
a defendant would provide a "deep pocket" from which the plaintiff could obtain recov-
ery. Additionally, the court might have concluded that the defendants breached their 
duty to protect Jablonski's girlfriend because the court was appalled that the psychia-
trists did not obtain Jablonski's old medical records. 
119. 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805. 
120. [d. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
121. [d. at 700, 669 P.2d at 43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 807. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. 
124. [d. See 6 NAT'L L.J. 4 (Oct. 17, 1983). 
17
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protect him.1211 The child sustained no physical injuries.126 
A year and a half after the incident, La Nita learned that 
Stephen had told their therapists of his intent to harm her.127 La 
Nita brought suit against the psychologists on her behalf as well 
as on behalf of her young son, who she claimed suffered serious 
emotional and psychological injuries.128 The superior court over-
ruled the defendant psychologists' demurrer which charged that 
the one year statute of limitations for personal injury barred La 
Nita's claim.129 The court also dismissed the psychologists' claim 
that they owed no duty to warn Darryl of the threat made to his 
mother. lao 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the superior court 
ruling, and concluded that La Nita, as well as Darryl, could state 
a cause of action.13l The court initially addressed the statute of 
limitations issue and ruled that a psychotherapist who fails to 
comply with the Tarasoff duty to warn commits professional 
negligence rather than ordinary negligence.132 The court rea-
soned that the implementation of adequate means to protect an 
intended victim is as much a component of a psychotherapist's 
duty as is the diagnosis of patient violence; both facets involved 
the rendering of professional services.133 Therefore, the three 
year statue of limitations for professional negligence, rather than 
the one year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence, ap-
125. 34 Cal. 3d at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
126. [d. 
127. See NAT'L L.J. supra note 124. 
128. 34 Cal. 3d at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. La Nita's claim alleged 
that the psychotherapists, "in the exercise of the professional skill, knowledge and care 
possessed by members of their specialty, should have known that Stephen presented a 
serious danger of violence to her." [d. Furthermore, the psychotherapists "owed her and 
other foreseeable victims a duty to diagnose Stephen's condition, to realize that he 
presented a serious threat of violence to her, and to recognize that the requirements of 
their profession required them to notify her of the danger." [d. 
129. [d. at 699, 669 P.2d at 42, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806. La Nita and her son were 
injured on April 9, 1979. La Nita did not learn about Stephen's threats of violence to-
ward her until more than a year and a half later; she did not file suit until Nov. 12, 1980. 
[d. at 700, 669 P.2d at 42-43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806-07. See also NAT'L L.J. supra note 
124. 
130. 34 Cal. 3d at 699, 669 P.2d at 42, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806. 
131. [d. at 704, 707, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. 
132. [d. at 699-705, 669 P.2d at 42-46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 806-10. 
133. [d. at 703, 669 P.2d at 45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809. The statute of limitations did 
not interfere with Darryl's cause of action because the limitation period was tolled while 
he was a minor. [d. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
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plied, and the court upheld La Nita's claim. IS. 
The court then turned to Darryl's complaint which reiter-
ated allegations made by his mother.l3II The defendants claimed 
they had no duty to warn the boy because Stephen had made no 
threat against him.ls6 Therefore, the defendants argued, Darryl's 
complaint failed to state a cause of action in negligence. ls7 How-
ever, the court asserted that Darryl was both a foreseeable and 
identifiable victim of an assault upon his mother, and therefore, 
the therapists owed him a duty. ISS 
In formulating its conclusion that injury to Darryl was fore-
seeable, the majority relied upon supporting precedent in Dillon 
v. Legg l39 and Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals. uo In Dil-
lon, a mother claimed that she suffered emotional trauma and 
physical injury as a result of witnessing the death of her young 
child who was struck by a negligently driven automobile. l4l The 
Dillon court listed several factors to consider when determining 
whether or not injury to a third party was foreseeable, and in 
applying those factors found the injuries to the decedent child's 
mother foreseeable. 142 The Hedlund court reasoned that the mi-
nor boy's emotional trauma was as foreseeable as the mother's 
emotional trauma in Dillon.us In fact, the Hedlund majority as-
134. [d. at 704, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
135. See supra note 128. 
136. 34 Cal. 3d at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
137. [d. 
138. [d. at 705-06, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. 
139. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). 
140. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). 
141. 68 Cal. 2d at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. 
142. [d. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81. The factors to be 
considered in determining if an accident is reasonably foreseeable are: 
[d. 
(1) [w)hether plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. 
(2) [w)hether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the ac-
cident from others after its occurrence. (3) [w)hether plaintiff 
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an ab-
sence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant 
relationship. 
143. 34 Cal. 3d at 706,669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The Hedlund court also 
argued that it was not unreasonable to impose a duty to persons in close relation to the 
object of a patient's threat. [d. The court reasoned that therapists must consider the 
19
Small: Psychotherapist Liability
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985
290 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:271 
serted that the Dillon opinion compelled the Hedlund 
conclusion. l44 
In Molien, the plaintiff claimed that he suffered emotional 
distress after his wife was misdiagnosed as having syphilis.l4~ 
The Molien court ruled that the physicians' duty to warn ex-
tended to the patient's husband because it was foreseeable that 
a close member of the patient's family would be emotionally dis-
tressed by such a diagnosis.l46 The Hedlund court contended 
that the psychotherapists' duty to protect extended to La Nita's 
son because emotional injury to him was no less foreseeable than 
emotional injury to the patient's husband in Molien. 147 Addi-
tionally, the Hedlund court relied upon Molien to sustain a 
cause of action in negligence for emotional distress without asso-
ciated physical injuries.148 
The majority opinion is significant because the California 
Supreme Court extended the psychotherapists' duty to protect 
third parties to include persons other than just the intended vic-
tim. The court in Hedlund, for the first time, established that 
liability may exist not only for harm to a threatened victim, but 
also for harm to others foreseeably injured if the threats were 
carried out.149 Considering the holdings of Dillon and Molien, it 
is not surprising that the Hedlund court broadened the psycho-
therapists' duty to protect third parties. Although not surpris-
ing, the Hedlund decision is somewhat troubling. A psychothera-
pist has a legal duty to do whatever is reasonable under the 
circumstances to protect an intended victim of violent threats 
made by a patient in the course of therapy. The Tarasof/ deci-
presence of such persons "both in evaluating the seriousness of the danger posed by the 
patient and in determining the appropriate steps to be taken to protect the named vic-
tim." [d. 
144. [d. at 706, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. 
145. 27 Cal. 3d at 920, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833. During a routine 
physical exam, Mrs. Molien's physicians erroneously examined and tested her for 
syphilis. The physicians instructed her to telJ her husband of the diagnosis; Mr. Molien 
was required to have a blood test to determine whether he was the source of his wife's 
purported venereal disease. Mr. Molien claimed that his wife started to suspect that he 
had engaged in extramarital sex, and their marriage dissolved. He also alleged a loss of 
consortium. [d. at 919-20, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33. 
146. [d. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835. 
147. 34 Cal. 3d at 707, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811. 
148. [d. at 706 n.8, 669 P.2d at 47 n.8, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811 n.8. 
149. [d. at 705-07, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11. 
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sion mandates that action. 1GO However, the court's imposition of 
liability for foreseeable injury to persons other than the in-
tended victim may extend the Tarasoff duty to protect to an 
unwarranted and unworkable extreme. 
Although the Hedlund court significantly extended the duty 
to protect, it provided minimal guidelines defining the scope of 
foreseeable injury for which psychotherapists may be liable. For 
example, the Hedlund court did not decide whether or not psy-
chotherapists have a duty to protect all injured bystanders. 161 
On the contrary, the court premised its decision that injury to 
Darryl was foreseeable upon the fact that he was the threatened 
victim's minor child.162 As a result, the courts are left to decide 
whether or not to impose liability if injury is to an ordinary by-
stander rather than to a close member of an intended victim's 
family. If the courts continue their recent trend to broaden the 
scope of the psychotherapists' duty to protect third parties, they 
may extend the duty to all injured bystanders.1G3 
C. The State of the Law Today 
These recent cases defining the scope of the psychothera-
pists' duty to protect leave many unanswered questions. The 
Tarasoff duty to protect third parties is firmly entrenched in 
California law. However, Tarasoff did not clearly define the pa-
rameters of this duty.164 The Tarasoff majority fashioned a 
vaguely defined liability around a narrow set of facts.m As a re-
150. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
151. 34 Cal. 3d at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The Hedlund court 
asserted that it need not decide whether a duty exists as to all bystanders because "[t]he 
question posed by Darryl's claim [was] narrower because there could be no reasonable 
difference of opinion that the risk of harm to him was foreseeable." [d. 
152. [d. 
153. Another related issue is whether or not the courts, when faced with an injured 
victim, will be tempted to premise the foreseeability of harm somewhat upon the severity 
of injury; a court may be more willing to label an injury foreseeable if it is severe rather 
than minor. 
154. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
155. In Tarasoff, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendant psychotherapists 
did predict that their patient would kill. 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. at 25. Also, the victim was readily identifiable. See supra text accompanying note 
15. Furthermore, the treating psychotherapist notified the police that his patient was 
dangerous. 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. "[O]n the facts of 
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suIt, the courts must define the scope of the duty to protect each 
time they address a unique fact pattern. Thus, this area of the 
law is very unsettled. 
The Jablonski and Hedlund decisions significantly broad-
ened the scope of the duty psychotherapists owe toward persons 
other than their patients. IllS The psychotherapeutic community 
is troubled by the consistent broadening of this duty.11I7 This 
concern, as well as objections to the courts' expectation that psy-
chotherapists accurately predict patient dangerousness, IllS pre-
cipitated introduction of A.B. 2900. 1119 
III. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION 
A. Assembly Bill 2900 
On February 13, 1984 Assemblyman Alister McAlister intro-
duced A.B. 2900, ISO originally sponsored by the California State 
Tarasoff it is difficult to see what the therapist did that was wrong other than fail to 
warn the family." See Givelber, supra note 4, at 484. 
156. See supra notes 88-153 and accompanying text. 
157. See Mills, supra note 10, at 239. 
158. See Press Release from Assemblyman McAlister (March 7, 1984) (copy on file 
at Golden Gate University Law Review Office) [hereinafter cited as Press Release]. For 
excerpts from McAlister's Press Release, see supra text accompanying notes 162-63. 
159. See Press Release, supra note 158. 
160. See A.B. 2900, supra note 12. A.B. 2900 reads in its entirety: 
Section 1. Section 43.92 is added to the Civil Code to read: 
43.92 (a) There shall be no monetary liability on the 
part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any 
person who is a psychotherapist as defined in Section 
1010 of the Evidence Code in failing to warn of and 
protect from a patient's threatened violent behavior or 
failing to predict and warn of and protect from a pa-
tient's violent behavior except where the patient has 
communicated to the psychotherapist an acutal threat 
of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable 
victim or victims. 
(b) If there is a duty to warn and protect under 
the limited circumstances specified above, the duty 
shall be discharged by the psychotherapist making rea-
sonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim 
or victims. 
Id. This is the final amended form of A.B. 2900 (amended in Senate) (Aug. 15, 1984). In 
its original form, A.B. 2900 provided immunity from liability, "as against all foreseeable 
victims . . . except where the patient has communicated . . . an actual knowledge that 
the patient has a history of dangerous violent behavior." See A.B. 2900 supra note 12. 
Also, the bill provided that the duty would be discharged by communication of the 
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Psychological Association.161 McAlister proposed the bill primar-
ily "to abolish the expansive rulings of Taraso/f and Hedlund to 
the effect that a therapist can be held liable for the mere failure 
to predict and warn of potential violence by his patient. "162 Ac-
cording to McAlister, "[s]uch extremely broad and open-ended 
liability is premised upon a degree of confidence in the predic-
tive ability of psychologists and psychiatrists that is simply un-
justified in the light of our best scientific and common sense 
knowledge."16s At a hearing on A.B. 2900, McAlister alleged 
there is no scientific knowledge enabling therapists to make pre-
cise and certain predictions of patient fulfillment of threats of 
violence.164 McAlister claimed that his bill did not exactly re-
verse Taraso/f.165 He perceived A.B. 2900 as "a respectable mid-
dle road" that attempted to narrow the broadening of psycho-
therapist liability.166 
Other proponents of A.B. 2900 expressed various reasons for 
legislative intervention.167 Dr. David Allen, Professor of Psychia-
try at the University of California, claimed that A.B. 2900 would 
provide better protection for the public because physicians 
would be less reluctant to work with violent patients who would, 
in turn, be more likely to seek help.168 He alleged that since 
Taraso/f, there had been an expanding tort liability which in-
fringed upon the civil rights of patients.169 Additionally, he ex-
pressed the belief that psychotherapists must offer the public 
some protection, but that it was impossible to warn everyone 
with whom a violent patient comes into contact.170 According to 
Allen, professional ethics themselves provided sufficient guide-
threat by the psychiatrist or psychologist to the identified victim "or local law enforce-
ment agency." [d. 
161. See Press Release, supra note 158, at 1. 
162. See id. at 6. 
163. [d. 
164. Hearing on A.B. 2900 Before the Sen. Comm. on Jud., Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. 
(1983-1984) (attended by the author Aug. 7, 1984) (notes of the Hearing on file at 
Golden Gate University Law Review Office). 
165. [d. 
166. [d. 
167. See infra notes 168-81 and accompanying text. For a list of several groups sup-
porting the bill, see Analysis of A.B. 2900 for Sen. Comm. on Jud. prepared by Gene 
Wong (Consultant to Sen. Comm. on Jud.) (copy on file at Golden Gate University Law 
Review Office) [hereinafter cited as Analysis of A.B. 2900). 
168. See supra note 164 (statement of Dr. David Allen). 
169. [d. 
170. [d. 
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lines for psychotherapists' decisions whether or not to warn 
third parties. l7l 
According to a representative of the California State Psy-
chological Institute (CPI), A.B. 2900 would foster the obligation 
of a psychotherapist to warn victims and to protect patients' 
rights. 172 The CPI predicted that more warnings would occur as 
a result of A.B. 2900.173 Furthermore, the CPI contended that 
the psychotherapeutic community clearly needed "succinct and 
specific language" to replace the ambiguity which existed.174 A 
representative of the California State Psychological Association 
(CSPA), which also supported the bill,17II argued that the legisla-
ture should devise a clear set of statutory guidelines for psycho-
therapists' utilization in discharging responsibility to public and 
clients. 176 
The California Medical Association (CMA) was another pro-
ponent of A.B. 2900. 177 According to the CMA, the bill "would 
place some reasonable boundaries in an unclear area of liability 
that California's judicially active [s]upreme [c]ourt has created 
and continues to expand. "178 The CMA contended that psycho-
therapists "have been caught in a real dilemma" since Tarasoff 
and Hedlund. 179 Also, the bill "represent[ed] an important clari-
fication of the extent of the therapist's duty to warn and how 
that duty may be discharged."180 
Opposition to A.B. 2900 was voiced by the Citizens' Com-
mission on Human Rights (CCHR).l81 The CCHR claimed that 
171. Id. The American Psychiatric Association's Principles of Medical Ethics states, 
"[p]sychiatrists at times may find it necessary, in order to protect patient or community 
from imminent danger, to reveal confidential, information disclosed by the patient." See 
Principles of Medical Ethics, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1063 (1973). 
172. See supra note 164 (statement of a CPI representative). 
173. Id. 
174.Id. 
175. See supra note 164 (statement of a CSPA representative). 
176. Id. 
177. See infra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. 
178. See letter from Tim Shannon (Assoc. Director of the CMA) to Governor 
Deukmejian (Aug. 28, 1984) (copy on file at Golden Gate Law Review Office). 
179. Id. "While having to be ever mindful of protecting the public, therapists must 
also be concerned that requiring them to warn potential victims will frequently result in 
the breach of patients' confidentiality." Id. 
180. Id. 
181. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. "The [CCHR] ... reflect[sJ 
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A.B. 2900 was an "emotional piece of legislation which open[ed] 
the door to potential violence by removing current protection af-
forded the public."I82 According to the CCHR, "crime is on the 
rise," and legislation should preserve rather than abrogate the 
psychotherapists' duty to warn.183 The CCHR also asserted that 
psychotherapists, who hold themselves out as experts, "should 
be held accountable as experts when their actions or inactions 
result in injury to another."184 At the very least, psychothera-
pists "should be held accountable to notify law enforcement 
agencies of potential violent acts on the part of their 
patients. "1811 
In spite of extensive support from the psychotherapeutic 
community, Governor Deukmejian vetoed A.B. 2900.188 The 
Governor claimed that the bill would narrow the Tarasoff deci-
sion and limit psychotherapists' liability, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of danger to the public.187 He was concerned that a 
requirement to warn third parties only if an actual threat were 
communicated "may excuse conduct which should be actiona-
ble."188 The Governor recognized that the psychotherapists' duty 
toward third parties is a difficult area of the law.189 However, he 
asserted, the standard should be refined to give greater protec-
tion to the public.190 
B. Critique of A.B. 2900 
A.B. 2900 sought to provide immunity to a licensed psycho-
therapist for failure to warn or protect third parties unless the 
patient "ha[d] communicated to the psychotherapist an actual 
threat of violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or vic-
the views of many individual letter writers .... " See Analysis of A.B. 2900, supra note 
167, at 6. For a list of others opposing the hill, see id. at 1. 
182. See supra note 164 (statement of Cynthia Denkler) (a CCHR representative). 
183. [d. 
184. See Analysis of A.B. 2900, supra note 167, at 6. 
185. [d. 
186. See Governor's Memo supra note 13. 
187. [d. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. 
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tims."191 In so limiting the potential for liability, A.B. 2900 
would have significantly impacted the Tarasoff decision and 
subsequent California cases interpreting Tarasoff, in several 
ways. 
First, the· Tarasoff court imposed liability not only if ther-
apists failed to protect third parties after they had actually de-
termined patient dangerousness, but also if therapists failed to 
protect after they "should have determined" patient dangerous-
ness.192 The "should have determined" language of Tarasoff has 
generated extensive opposition because psychotherapists con-
tend that there is no agreed upon standard for predicting pa-
tient dangerousness.19s A.B. 2900 would have alleviated the 
problem of predicting dangerousness. By imposing liability only 
if an actual threat of violence were communicated, the bill would 
have placed significantly fewer demands upon the predictive 
abilities of psychotherapists. 
Although psychotherapists would no longer have to comply 
with an inconsistent standard for predicting dangerousness, A.B. 
2900 would have created associated problems. A hypothetical ex-
ample illustrates this point. Suppose, in the course of therapy, a 
patient with a known history of violent behavior toward women 
tells his treating psychotherapist "I'm feeling violent. I don't 
know what I'm capable of doing." The patient storms out of the 
office, goes home, and kills his wife. Under A.B. 2900, the psy-
chotherapist would not have incurred a duty to protect because 
the patient did not communicate an actual threat of violence. 
Such a result is unreasonable. In spite of the absence of an ac-
tual threat, liability should be imposed if a patient manifests an 
intent to commit violent attacks.194 
Second, Tarasoff established that psychotherapists might 
incur a duty to protect "intended" and "foreseeable" victims.1911 
The Hedlund court extended this duty to persons who stand in 
191. See supra note 136. 
192. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
193. See supra note 8. 
194 .. See supra text accompanying note 188 (Governor Deukmejian expressed a sim-
ilar concern when he vetoed A.B. 2900). 
195. 17 Cal. 3d at 438 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.11. 
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a close relationship to the victim.11l6 Although A.B. 2900 might 
have narrowed the expanding scope of the duty owed third par-
ties to "a reasonably identifiable victim or victims,"11l7 the bill 
would have raised related objections. A statute that attempts to 
define the scope of the duty to protect should not premise liabil-
ity upon whether or not a victim is readily identifiable. The im-
position of liability should be based upon whether or not, under 
the circumstances, a psychotherapist could prevent injury to a 
third person. Two hypothetical examples illustrate this point. 
Suppose, in the course of therapy, a patient states "I am going 
to kill everybody with blue eyes." A reasonable court should not 
impose liability upon psychotherapists for failure to warn every 
blue-eyed person whom their patient might kill. However, sup-
pose another patient states "I am going to kill my girlfriend." 
Subsequently, and in the absence of a warning to the girlfriend, 
the patient shoots and kills her. He also shoots and kills his girl-
friend's housekeeper who is present at the time. The blue-eyed 
victims and the housekeeper were not readily identifiable. As a 
result, under A.B. 2900, liability would not have been imposed in 
either case. However, the two situations are distinguishable. In 
the former example, the psychotherapist could not have pre-
vented the shootings by issuing warnings. In the latter example, 
it would have been possible for the psychotherapist to prevent 
the housekeeper's death by warning the patient's girlfriend; the 
duty to protect should extend to the housekeeper. 
Additionally, A.B. 2900 would have significantly limited the 
manner in which psychotherapists could have discharged their 
duty toward third parties. The duty could be discharged only if 
psychotherapists made "reasonable efforts to communicate the 
threat to the victim or victims. "1118 As a result, A.B. 2900 would 
have clarified the vague guidelines Tarasoff established for dis-
charging the duty to protect. 11l1l However, if the bill would have 
been enacted, a related issue would have been raised. Suppose, 
due to time constraints or the absence of information regarding 
the whereabouts of the intended victim, psychotherapists were 
unable to contact the person threatened by their patient. In-
stead, the police or close members of a potential victim's family 
196. 34 Cal. 3d at 706-07, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811. 
197. See Analysis of A.B. 2900, supra note 167. 
198. See supra note 160. 
199. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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were able to warn the threatened individual. Even in the ab-
sence of a direct warning by a psychotherapist, the public's in-
terest in safety would be adequately served if the psychothera-
pist used reasonable efforts to notify persons capable of warning 
the intended victim. 
C. Proposal of a Model Duty to Protect Statute 
In spite of the Governor's veto of A.B. 2900, a statute, 
designed to remedy the inadequacies of the common law, should 
be adopted. The psychotherapists' duty to protect third parties, 
first described in Tarasofroo and subsequently expanded in 
Jablonski201 and Hedlund,202 is ill-defined. The courts should 
not bear the burden of defining the duty to protect in future 
cases. Furthermore, psychotherapists need clear and equitable 
guidelines providing a consistent definition of the duty to pro-
tect and how it can be discharged. There may be less risk to 
public safety if psychotherapists understand the nature and 
scope of their legal duty.208 
This Comment proposes a model statute that attempts to 
strike a favorable balance among the interests at issue. In cer-
tain circumstances, psychotherapists may be the only individu-
als aware of the likelihood of future acts of violence by their pa-
tients. In these situations, psychotherapists can play an 
important role in eliminating threats to public safety. However, 
there may be times when psychotherapists are unable to utilize 
their prior knowledge to prevent violent attacks. Therefore, the 
proposed statute imposes a legal duty to protect only if reasona-
ble efforts can be employed to prevent danger to third parties. 
Proposed Model Statute 
(a) There shall be no monetary liability on 
the part of, and no cause of action shall arise 
against, any persons who are psychothera-
pists as defined in Section 1010 of the Evi-
200. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 89-118 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 119-53 and accompanying text. 
203. See Givelber, supra note 4, at 466. 
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dence Code in failing to protect a person or 
persons other than their patients, from vio-
lent assaults by their patients unless, in the 
course of therapy, a patient, through words 
or conduct, manifests an intent to violently 
attack another person. 
(b) If there is a duty to protect under the 
circumstances specified in section (a), the 
duty will extend to (1) the intended victim 
or victims and (2) to all others whose inju-
ries were proximately caused by the failure 
of a psychotherapist to protect the intended 
victim or victims, but only if their injuries 
could have been prevented by the psycho-
therapist using any of the alternatives for 
discharging the duty to protect listed in sec-
tion (c) below. 
(c) If there is a duty to protect under the 
circumstances specified in sections (a) and 
(b), that duty shall be discharged by the 
psychotherapist making reasonable efforts to 
communicate the potential for violence ei-
ther to the intended victim or victims, the 
police, or close members of the intended vic-
tim's family.204 
IV. CONCLUSION 
299 
In the decade since the 1974 Tarasoff decision, California 
courts have had several opportunities to define the scope of the 
psychotherapists' duty to warn or protect third parties. Al-
though the courts refused to extend this duty in Thompson and 
Bellah, the recent decisions of Jablonski, and particularly Hed-
lund significantly extended the potential for liability. Perceiving 
what they consider to be a dangerous trend, psychotherapists 
have voiced multiple concerns. In response to these objections, 
the legislature approved A.B. 2900. Proponents of the bill hoped 
204. The psychotherapists' duty to protect is a difficult area of the law. See supra 
note 189 and accompanying text. Although the proposed statute attempts to balance the 
complex interests involved, the psychotherapeutic community may perceive the model as 
an unwarranted extension of their duty beyond that narrowly described in A.B. 2900. 
Hopefully, the expanded potential for liability is balanced by the added alternative 
means of discharging the duty. 
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that statutory guidelines would eliminate the need for psycho-
therapists to predict patient dangerousness. They also looked to 
A.B. 2900 as a means to limit the courts' expansion of the class 
of potential plaintiffs. In spite of extensive support from the 
psychotherapeutic community, Governor Deukmejian vetoed 
A.B. 2900. The Governor expressed concern that the bill would 
limit the psychotherapists' duty to protect in such a way as to 
increase the likelihood of danger to the public. 
The Governor's veto leaves significant issues unresolved. 
Psychotherapists are left with a vague and expanding duty to-
ward persons other than their patients. The courts still have to 
balance the complex interests of psychotherapists, patients, and 
the public whenever they address and reshape the duty. This 
Comment proposes a model statute that provides the legal and 
mental health professions with clear and equitable guidelines 
that define the scope of the duty to protect. The legislature and 
the Governor should reexamine the challenges of the Tarasoff 
legacy, and enact a statute that adequately addresses the com-
plex interests involved. 
Leslie B. Small* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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